Jamie Kirchick’s blanket statement in his review of ‘Frank’ that ‘readers’ eyes will glaze over’ at the recounting of the financial crisis is a typical attitude. The political media’s allergy to policy is a clear culprit here. I suppose those reviewing ’Frank’ can offer an excuse about this being ‘old news’…. Nobody in the Obama Administration has ever denied the anecdote…. Congress fulfilled its obligation, and the Administration didn’t….įrank… first leveled in May 2012 in an interview with New York magazine. In the end, the Obama transition wrote a letter promising to get to the foreclosure relief later, if Congress would only pass the second tranche of TARP funds. It was OK to help auto companies prior to Inauguration Day, just not homeowners. We know from David Axelrod’s book that the Obama transition did urge the Bush administration to provide TARP loans to GM and Chrysler…. Obama’s unwillingness to take responsibility before holding full authority doesn’t match other decisions made at that time. ![]() Obama rejected the request, saying ‘we have only one president at a time.’ Frank writes, ‘my frustrated response was that he had overstated the number of presidents currently on duty’…. but this scandals a big reason there was never a Sen. Alben Barkley that the Army handle such scandal by offering an officer. But there was one condition: He would only do it if the President-elect asked him to.’… President Franklin Roosevelt even suggested to Sen. Frank writes, ‘Paulson agreed to include homeowner relief in his upcoming request for a second tranche of TARP funding. This bank was little known until a couple of years ago when the bank decided to kick President Trump out of the bank by closing his accounts. Frank left the House and was assigned to the Board of Signature Bank. Frank made his anger clear over this ignoring of Congress’ intentions at a hearing with Paulson that November…. The monstrosity was the Dodd-Frank bill, named in part for Barney Frank. The Bush administration… used none of the first tranche on mortgage relief, nor did Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson use any leverage over firms receiving the money to persuade them to lower mortgage balances and prevent foreclosures. Shortly after these new mandates went into effect, the nation's homeownership rate-which had remained at about 64 since 1982-began to rise, increasing 3.3 from 64.2 in 1994 to 67.5 in 2000. …Without that language, TARP would not have passed…. David Dayen: Barney Frank Explains the Financial Crisis: “The TARP legislation included specific instructions to use a section of the funds to prevent foreclosures…
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
Details
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |